TSB: Multiple factors led to crab boat Tyhawk sinking off Cape Breton

When the crew of the Tyhawk set out from Cheticamp to dump their second load of crab traps on April 3, 2021, they were exhausted and steaming into weather in a vessel with compromised stability.

The Transportation Safety Board released its report into the Tyhawk’s sinking Wednesday.

The investigation into the incident that took the life of the Tyhawk’s captain, Craig (Jumbo) Sock, and crewman Seth Monahan, identified the use of a removable deck that significantly raised the 13.61-metre Northumberland style fishing boat’s centre of gravity, water raising in the bilge and the lower deck unnoticed, crew exhaustion and a decision to open the season three weeks earlier than the previous season as contributing factors.

“This past March, we sat right in this very room to discuss our investigation into the 2020 fatal sinking of the Chief William Saulis, a scallop fishing vessel that didn’t have a formal stability assessment in place, which resulted in operating decisions being made without sufficient knowledge of the safe operating limits,” said Kathy Fox, chair of the Transportation Safety Board, while releasing the report.

“The lives of six fish harvesters were lost that day. And in the eight months since we released that report, five more fish harvesters have died, one is missing at sea and 11 more have suffered serious injuries. It’s important for operators to know their vessels limits and operate within them.”

Boat modifications

The Tyhawk was built in 2001 along the design of inshore lobster fishing vessels commonly used for day trips along the Northumberland Strait.

Owned by the Elsipogtog First Nation in New Brunswick, a large aluminum working deck was added the following year to make it better suited for the crab fishery. The use of removable decks like the one placed on the Tyhawk is a common practice to create a larger working area and increase room to store catch when the owners of Northumberland style lobster boats seek to use them in the snow crab and herring fisheries.

The main deck of the Tyhawk was 1.6 metres above the keel.

The 900-kilogram removable deck was a further 1.4 metres higher. On top of that deck were stacked traps and other equipment.

The Tyhawk had unsealed hatches on its main deck – water was kept from pouring down into the bilge solely by a 10-centimetre-high combing around the hatch.

In April 2013, Transport Canada inspected the Tyhawk.

“The inspection certificate was issued with a lengthy deficiency notice of regulatory non-compliances attached,” reads the TSB report.

“The notice included an undersized engine shaft, a requirement to add an escape hatch, and a requirement to perform a stability assessment because the vessel had been modified by the addition of the removable deck.”

The inspection certificate issued allowed the Tyhawk to fish for another six months but required the deficiencies to be fixed.

Stability assessments not done

The stability assessment was not commissioned by the Elsipogtog First Nation and the stability questionnaire its master was required to fill out was not completed when Transport Canada returned in 2014 to look at the Tyhawk again.

Another short-term inspection was issued to allow it to continue fishing, along with a deficiency notice of items that needed fixing.

Transport Canada returned to the Tyhawk in April 2015.

A stability assessment (typically performed by naval architects) still hadn’t been done.

The Tyhawk’s captain did, however, fill out a stability questionnaire while the inspection was taking place.

“The master identified the removable deck as being on board but did not identify it as a stability risk factor that contributed substantial top-side weight,” reads the TSB report.

“The master also identified traps/pots and a loading boom/crane as being on board. An inspection certificate was issued for the rest of the term, which expired in April 2017.”

When Transport Canada inspected the Tyhawk in 2017, no stability assessment had been done.

However, the removable deck was not on it when the inspector visited.

“Records show that some, but not all, of the items on the original June 2013 deficiency notice had been addressed,” reads the report.

“The removable deck was not in place at the time of the inspection, and TC considered that the deficiencies related to the removable deck identified in 2013 no longer existed.”

A valid inspection certificate valid for four years was issued.

Season opened early

On April 1, 2021, Fisheries and Oceans Canada announced that the Area 12 (off western Cape Breton) snow crab season would open at the stroke of midnight on April 2.

The decision was made after consultation with industry but against concerns raised by leadership in the Elsipogtog First Nation. According to the TSB, one of the motivating factors was a desire to avoid entangling right whales when they began migrating into the gulf of St. Lawrence.

An excavator was brought in to break up the ice in Richibucto Harbour, the Tyhawk was launched and at 4:35 a.m. on April 2, Captain Sock and four crew steamed out on the 16-hour trip along the Northumberland Strait and up to Cheticamp.

Another four crew members travelled by truck, met them at the wharf in Cheticamp and began loading 75 large crab traps and bait aboard the Tyhawk’s removable deck.

At 2:40 a.m. on April 3, the Tyhawk departed fully loaded with traps and eight crew members in freezing sleet to its fishing grounds some 20 nautical miles offshore.

The steam out took about two hours, the traps were all baited and set and the Tyhawk returned to Cheticamp. The original four crew members who’d travelled with Captain Sock on the Tyhawk from Richibucto went and got some sleep.

Sock, meanwhile, supervised the loading of 50 more crab traps, along with 225 kilograms of bait, and buoys onto the removable deck.

Bad weather

At 3:20 p.m. the Tyhawk left Cheticamp for the crab grounds again.

Captain Sock, who’d been awake for about 36 hours, took a nap, as did three of the crew members while another stayed at the wheel. The crewman at the wheel had only made three fishing trips before.

Northerly winds had picked up to 20-25 knots (37-46 kph) and sleet began accumulating on the Tyhawk.

The weight of the traps, gear and the removable heavy upper deck pushed the Tyhawk deeper into the water, while also making it roll further in up-to-two-metre swells that struck it on the starboard side.

The freezing rain and ice accumulated high on the vessel and along with shipped seas poured around the unsealed upper deck, into the lower deck unseen and into the bilge.

The water on the lower deck became subject to something known in maritime circles as the “free surface effect” – the water travelled back and forth unhindered, gained momentum and forced the boat to roll further.

A more experienced crew member came on watch, adjusted a remote operated camera in the engine compartment to get a better look at the bilge and saw water accumulating. An alarm meant to alert the crew to water in the bilge hadn’t gone off.

At 5:35 p.m., they woke Captain Sock, who’d only gotten half an hour of sleep.

Sock turned on the Tyhawk’s two bilge pumps and took the wheel.

He told the crew to prepare to start setting the traps.

At about 5:40 p.m., a crew member seeking to get gear from the lower deck discovered the water sloshing back and forth toward the stern. They attempted to change the wash-pump configuration so it could pump the water off the lower deck, but the pump didn’t work.

“At this time, the weather seemed to become more severe, as did the vessel’s movements,” reads the report.

“Approximately a minute later, the vessel heeled to starboard, causing the water and spare gear on the main deck and the traps on the removable deck to also shift to starboard.”

One man was trapped by the shifting gear but was freed by his fellow crew.

With all the weight on one side of the boat, the Tyhawk listed hard to starboard in the heavy seas.

Distress message 

Captain Sock texted a distress message to the captain of the Northumberland Spray, some six nautical miles away. He then pressed the distress button on the Tyhawk’s VHF-DSC radio, but no message was received by nearby stations.

Due to its heavy list, the crew couldn’t get to the life jackets stowed in the forward compartment. The new six-person life-raft that had been stowed unsecured on the upper deck fell into the lower deck and became inaccessible.

At about 5:42 p.m., the Tyhawk capsized.

One of the crewmembers scrambled up on the upturned hull and called 911 on his cellphone.

Captain Sock helped another crew member out of the wheelhouse into the water, before escaping himself.

All four crew and the captain initially managed to climb aboard the upturned vessel.

“As the overturned Tyhawk sank lower in the water, wave action repeatedly swept (Sock and Monahan) clear of the hull and into the water,” reads the report.

“The other crew members pulled them back onto the hull several times but, eventually, (Monahan and Sock) remained in the water.”

The Northumberland Spray found the upturned Tyhawk at 6:34 p.m. and brought its crew onboard.

Captain Sock could not be found.

The Northumberland Spray brought them back to Cheticamp.

While the other three crew members received medical treatment, Monahan was pronounced dead.

The TSB made three recommendations in its report:

• Department of Transport introduce objective criteria to define major modifications to small fishing vessels and other small commercial vessels. Under this, a removable deck could lead to a mandatory vessel stability test.
• the Department of Transport require that planned modifications to small fishing vessels and other small commercial vessels be assessed by a competent person, that all records of modifications to these vessels be maintained, and that the records be made available to the Department.
• that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans ensure that policies, procedures, and practices include comprehensive identification of hazards and assessment of associated risks to fish harvesters when fisheries resource management decisions are being made and integrate independent safety expertise into these processes

“Next week, thousands of fish harvesters and more than 1,500 small fishing vessels will be heading out for the opening of the lobster fishing seasons in Areas 33 and 34 in southwest nova scotia,” said Fox in her closing remarks.

“We know the lobster fishery is competitive and it’s common practice for vessels to be modified and fish harvesters to load their vessels with as many traps as possible on opening day. How many fish harvesters have to die before changes are made? Fish harvesters and operators don’t need to wait for the regulator to take action. Being proactive, going beyond regulatory minimums can save lives.”