Beijing exploits loopholes in Canadian law; David Matas suggests remedies
Beijing and other tyrannical regimes are exploiting loopholes in Canadian law to further their transnational repression in Canada, and a prominent international human rights lawyer says this is a problem that calls for comprehensive legislation to combat their foreign interference.
Winnipeg-based attorney David Matas, senior legal advisor for B’nai Brith Canada, said repressive states like China, Russia and Iran exploit organizations like the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to harass and intimidate their own nationals, even after they have fled abroad to escape persecution in their own countries. He said malicious state actors are also abusing conventional international cooperation mechanisms in criminal matters.
To address these and related growing concerns, he said Canada needs a comprehensive law that includes a requirement for individuals acting for foreign entities to register with the Canadian government, a code of conduct outlining what foreign actors can and cannot do can do, and strong prevention and enforcement mechanisms to deter, deport or punish offenders.
Mutual legal assistance
“Canada should not cooperate with tyrannical regimes in criminal matters,” Mr Matas said.
He gave the example of the misuse by such regimes of Interpol’s international fugitive wanted messages – commonly known as Red notices– which are issued to track down and arrest people “wanted for prosecution or to serve a sentence”.
A Red Notice must meet certain legal criteria and must comply with the Interpol Constitution, Article 3 of which prohibits Interpol from undertaking “any intervention or activity of a political, military, religious or racial nature”. Despite this measure, tyrannical regimes are becoming “sophisticated enough to know that they cannot accuse their targets of crimes based on internationally prohibited grounds,” Matas said.
“These regimes often shift the blame for their own misdeeds onto impotent scapegoats and accuse them of common law crimes,” he said. “The allegations are politically motivated, but the allegations are that crimes have been committed that are not political in themselves.”
A recent example occurred when the Hong Kong police arrest warrants issued for eight self-exiled pro-democracy activists on July 3, each with a reward of HK$1 million for their current whereabouts. They were charged with “incitement to secession”, “subversion”, “incitement to subversion”, and “conspiracy with a foreign country or with outside elements to endanger national security”.
The Hong Kong government released the transcript of a interview with Chris Tang, head of the Hong Kong Security Bureau, asking reporters whether Hong Kong police will seek help from Interpol or local Chinese communities in countries where the wanted individuals live. Mr. Tang said, “We are using all available means to arrest these wanted persons.”
Apart from Interpol, Mr. Matas also expressed concern about tyrannical regimes that abuse conventional mutual legal assistance agreements, such as the Ljubljana-The Hague Convention on International Co-operation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Other International Crimesadopted in May.
Mr Matas recommended that when Canada considers signing such treaties, it should make a so-called “reservation” to limit its obligations to only those states with which it has operational extradition treaties – states believed to have fair trials – and commit themselves to withdraw if this is not the case. unacceptable to other states.
In particular, Mr Matas noted that Canada should not cooperate “in efforts to remove from Canada anyone who has committed a crime under a tyrannical regime”.
Focused on family members
China also exploits loopholes in other countries directly through its consulates, targeting foreign officials such as Conservative MP Michael Chong. In early May, Ottawa declared Chinese consul officer Zhao Wei persona non grata after The Globe and Mail reportedciting an anonymous national security source that Mr. Zhao had helped seek information on Mr. Chong’s relatives living in Hong Kong in order to face them with sanctions.
Mr Chong was reportedly the target of supporting a motion in the House of Commons in 2021 to declare China’s mistreatment of Uyghurs and other Turkish minorities a genocide.
“If such behavior could be directed at someone as well known and publicly outspoken as Michael Chong, one can easily understand how widespread that behavior would be against targets who are not well known and too afraid to speak out,” said Mr Matas.
“In a perverse sense, Zhao Wei did us a favor by providing a glimpse of the ubiquitous abuse for which he set a dramatic example. We must take advantage of the awareness his misconduct has generated to act.
Election interference
A series of media reports published since late 2022 have highlighted Beijing’s interference in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections, citing leaked intelligence documents pointing to 11 federal candidates who reportedly received campaign funding from Beijing in the 2019 elections. According to several media reports, the Chinese regime also allegedly interfered in Vancouver’s 2022 municipal elections.
China’s operation of at least seven secret police stations on Canadian soil also calls for vigilance regarding foreign interference. The existence of these overseas police “fuel stations” in dozens of countries was first reported in September 2022 by the Spain-based NGO Safeguard Defenders, who described them as tools of the regime’s longstanding policing and transnational repression.
Reports of Beijing’s pervasive foreign meddling have led to increased calls for a register of foreign agents to be established to increase transparency around activities of those working in Canada to represent the interests of a foreign entity.
In response to the public outcry, the Liberal government in March appointed former Governor General David Johnston as a special rapporteur to assess the impact of foreign interference in the last two federal elections and to determine whether Canada should launch a public inquiry.
Mr Johnston decided not to hold a public inquiry, citing security concerns if secret documents were made public. In his first report-published in May – he also highlighted several mechanisms already in place to deal with foreign influence. However, his report made no mention of China’s operation of secret police stations in Canada. He also said he had not reviewed all of the intelligence before coming to his conclusion.
existing laws
Mr. Matas pointed to three existing laws in Canada that each lack certain features to fully combat foreign interference.
The Lobby law requires that a person who is paid to communicate with federal public office holders be registered with the government. But it does not regulate other forms of foreign influence, such as activities without pay or not contacting officials.
The Canadian Election Act prohibits “undue influence” by foreigners in Canadian federal elections during an election period, but there is no registration requirement.
“These two laws are insufficient to address the problem of influence attempts by foreign actors operating in Canada. Foreign agents sometimes operate in Canada without communicating with federal public office holders and without attempting to influence Canadian elections,” said Mr. Matas.
As for punishing those involved in foreign influence, as in the case of Mr. Zhao, the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (FMIOA) allows Canada to declare any member of a consular or diplomatic staff persona non grata for any reason or no reason.
While the FMIOA requires foreign states to report the names of their consular employees to the federal government, it does not require public registration or a code of conduct for foreign representatives. And as a remedy for foreign influence, expelling foreign diplomats from Canada “can only go so far,” Matas said.
to suggest
To make up for the shortcomings in Canadian legislation, Mr Matas said Canada needs more thorough legislation that addresses all aspects of foreign influence. The legislation should include, but not be limited to, a registration system. Rather, it should also describe activities that are prohibited for foreign actors.
Those subject to prohibitions should not only be those who are paid for their work, but also those who volunteer or spend no money on the job, depending on the activities they perform.
Mr Matas pointed to the example of US citizen Litang Liang, who was charged in the United States in May under the US Foreign Agents Registration Act. Mr. Liang was charged with acting as an illegal agent for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Among other activities, Mr. Liang allegedly provided the Chinese Consulate in New York in 2018 with the name of a former student activist, saying the former activist was responsible for destroying PRC flags in Boston’s Chinatown.
Mr Matas also said the legislation should not only target foreigners, but also cover Canadian citizens who engage in the banned activities.
Referring to Mr Chong’s case, he said: “Making, planning, facilitating or organizing such threats should be a prohibited activity, whether the activity is carried out by foreigners or the local population.”
Canada also needs a foreign influence commissioner similar to its lobbying commissioner, Mr Matas said. The Foreign Influence Commissioner should be able to receive complaints, both publicly and privately, about violations of the Code of Conduct by any person or entity, including violations by foreign embassies and consulates.
The Commissioner for Foreign Influence should also be required to report annually to Parliament, while also having the power to report at any time on matters of such urgency or importance that they do not need to be included in annual reporting. to wait.
