IDF releases part of its report on what happened on Oct. 7

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently released a detailed investigation into the events leading up to Hamas’ massacre on October 7, 2023. The investigation, which began in November 2023 and was ordered by outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, sheds light on the failures and shortcomings that allowed Hamas to carry out a large-scale surprise attack on Israeli territory.

According to the IDF’s assessment, between 5,000-5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves on October 7, resulting in the deaths of 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals, and 415 security personnel. The attacks also saw the kidnapping of 251 hostages who were taken into the Gaza Strip.

The investigation revealed that Hamas had been planning the attack for nearly seven years, with the initial concept being formed in November 2016. The operational plan was approved in July 2019, with preparations intensifying in the months leading up to the attack. The IDF noted that Hamas considered various dates for the attack before settling on October 7, 2023, which coincided with the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah.

The IDF’s assessment highlighted several key failures that allowed Hamas to carry out the massacre. One major oversight was the IDF’s focus on Iran and Hezbollah as primary threats, while underestimating the intentions and capabilities of Hamas. The IDF also failed to fully grasp the intelligence it had on Hamas’ plans for a large-scale attack, leading to a lack of preparedness for the events of October 7.

The investigation also revealed missed signs and indicators in the hours leading up to the attack, including the activation of Israeli sim cards inside Gaza and unusual Hamas activity. Despite these warning signs, the IDF did not change its assessment of the situation, resulting in a lack of alert for the impending offensive.

The IDF’s assessment also addressed the performance of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) during the attack. While the IAF met readiness standards, it was not prepared for a large-scale surprise attack, leading to challenges in distinguishing between civilians, IDF troops, and terrorists. The IDF acknowledged that it did not prepare for the level of brutality seen on October 7.

In conclusion, the IDF acknowledged its failures and shortcomings in assessing the threat posed by Hamas and preparing for a large-scale attack. The investigation emphasized the need for a preventative strategy in dealing with future threats and the importance of prioritizing the removal of threats rather than managing conflicts. The recommendations stemming from the investigation will be left to incoming IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, who will assume the role next week.